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An Empirical Analysis of Child Custody Decisions: A
Mulitnomial Logit Analysis of Case Level U.S. Data
Susan Gardner
Longwood University
Abstract
Despite growing interest in the analysis of family structure (in particular divorce) and its
impact on the social and economic development of children, little empirical research has
attempted to analyze the factors that explain the child custody decisions of the courts. In
this paper, I analyze a random sample of 222 state level child custody court decisions in
an attempt to uncover the factors that significantly influence the outcome of the decision.
In particular, using a multinomial logit approach, I am able to more accurately assess the
role of social, demographic, and legal characteristics of each case. Unlike previous work,
I examine the determinants of both physical and legal custody outcomes. My results
broadly suggest that the legal environment plays a substantial role in determining
outcomes, particularly with regard to joint custody decisions. Specifically, I find
evidence that laws favoring the presumption ofjoint custody tend to not only increase
joint physical and legal custody, but also father-sole legal and physical custody outcomes.
In addition, income measures as well as family characteristics (such as the child's gender
and presence of special needs) significantly impact the court's decision, albeit to a lesser
degree. Finally, I find no evidence supporting the claim that the judge's age or gender
has any impact on the child custody outcome. Future work may want to examine jointly
the child custody and child financial support decisions using a system of seemingly
unrelated regressions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Living arrangements have important impacts on the lives of children and parents
(Goldstein, et al. 1996; Mason 1999) 1 . Mason 1999 explains that traditionally courts
followed the "tender years doctrine" which generally favored the custodial rights of the
mother. However, this approach was replaced by the "best interest of the child" criteria,
which theoretically provided greater opportunities for both joint custody arrangements
and father-sole custody. Under this new regime, custody decisions are often thought to
rely on factors dealing with the relationship between the parents and between the parents
and the children. For example, the gender of the children, their ages, the social and
economic characteristics of the parents, and the principle reason for divorce are all widely
viewed as being essential in the custody decision of the judge. More recently, researchers
have also begun to speculate that the legal environment may also play an important role
in the custody outcome. The background of the judges and the specific laws and legal
precedents surrounding the case may also influence the outcome.
To date, few empirical studies have explored the determinants of child custody decisions
(exceptions include Cancian and Meyer 1998 and Maccoby and Mnookin 1992). In this
paper, I use a newly constructed cross state dataset to examine the impact of variables
descriptive of the parents (age, income, length of marriage), children (number of children,
ages, genders), and the courts (level, judge's gender, judge's age) on the decision of child
custody cases across states. Unlike previous research, I will examine both the physical
custody decision and the legal custody decision in order to compare and contrast the
impact alternative factors may play in each decision.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the motivation of the paper.
Section III briefly reviews the literature and provides background information on the
issues of child custody outcomes. Section IV presents the empirical model and describes
the data. Section V reports the results of the analyses while Section VI provides a
general overview of the important economic concepts related to the study. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION
The topic of child custody decisions crosses many fields of interest including economics,
law, and sociology. Though few studies were previously conducted on this subject, none
examined custody cases across states or conducted analysis on both physical and legal
custody practices separately. Therefore, this study is important in that it provides results
that are more specific and extend further than recent studies. In addition, the practice of
producing a quantitative analysis in order to answer a more social science oriented
1

Today, many custody arrangements are joint resulting in the shuttling of a child from one household to
another. Many experts agree that infants and younger children have a greater need for stability and
. therefore this arrangement can cause permanent psychological damage. It has also been proven that joint
custody is not effective in high-conflict families. However, it is these types of families that joint custody is
most often imposed or agreed upon. This arrangement can cause high amounts of stress in both the parents
and the children involved. For more information see Mason 1999 and Bowlby 1969.

qualitative question about child custody decisions introduces an important cross-over
between fields and produces results that may be useful to many different fields of interest.
ill. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Hutchins-Cook 2003 states that laws defining child custody and the legal rights of parents
concerning their children can be dated back to early Roman law around 30 B.C. to 500
AD. During this time children were considered the property of their fathers while
mothers did not have any legal rights to their children. From this law came the
presumption of paternal preference in English common law when deciding child custody
disputes. This presumption in favor of the father however, has been reevaluated several
times in the history of the American legal system.
Cultural changes slowly molded child custody guidelines from paternal preference
between the 1600's and 1800's to equal rights between parents by the end of the 1800's.
This view changed again, however, by the 1920's when it seemed fitting that the mother
be given the presumption of custody since they became the primary caretakers of children.
Finally present day views on child custody came about when in the 1960's and 70's
presumption of custody was returned to the former view that joint custody arrangements
are in the best interest of the child.
In this study, I will focus on the years after the 1920's when presumption of custody
changed from maternal preference to the presumption ofjoint custody. Artis 2004 states
that until the late 1960' s judges awarded custody automatically to mothers based on the
"Tender Years Doctrine." This doctrine was based on the notion that mothers have
natural nurturing abilities and a biological connection with their infants thus making them
the preferred parent in a custody dispute. Currently, all states have replaced the tender
years doctrine with the best interest of the child doctrine, which aims at being gender
neutral. This doctrine does not hold a presumption of preference for either parent,
although many activist groups disagree holding that the best interest of the child doctrine
does indeed provide an advantage to one parent over the other. The advantage provided,
however, depends upon which activist group is making the accusation.
Previous research predominantly focuses on the frequency of custody arrangements
within a single state. Citing studies performed on Wisconsin (Cancian and Meyer 1998),
Michigan (Fox and Kelly 1995), Minnesota (Christensen, Dahl, and Rettig 1990), and
California (Maccoby and Mnookin 1992) through the mid-1980s, most custody research
produced results reflecting the majority outcome of child custody decisions to be mother
sole physical custody. Moving into the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, this
presumption of maternal-sole custody gradually shifted as an increase in joint custody
and paternal-sole custody decisions came about.
In addition to studies on custody arrangements, previous empirical studies such as
Cancian and Meyer (1998) have also focused on the factors associated with determining a
custody decision. These studies produced results that suggested father-sole custody is

more likely granted when the children are boys or are of an older age. The income of
fathers' was also studied with inconsistent results- some studies suggesting that father
sole custody is less likely when the father has a higher income, while other studies
suggesting the opposite effect.
My paper most closely follows Cancian and Meyer (1998), although with significant
differences. They rely on a panel data of custody cases within the state of Wisconsin
over a number of years. My paper is strictly cross sectional allowing me to compare
alternative legal environments across states and their impact on custody decisions.
Furthermore, I identify both legal and physical custody unlike Cancian and Meyer (1998),
which allows a more complete analysis of the judicial outcome. Finally, I have
information regarding the background of the judges which allows for the assessment of
claims made in the theoretical literature regarding the role that judges backgrounds may
play in the child custody outcome.
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The data were collected through a random search of the LexisNexis database of court
cases in the United States. The database consisted of cases from the Family to Supreme
Court level and was organized by state. Originally, five cases from each state were
randomly chosen. However, incomplete data for some cases limited the sample size to
222. 2 Observations in this data set consist of child custody cases in which it is decided
that the child will live (physical custody) with the mother, father, or both and who will
have legal custody of the child or children. 3 Each state consisted of a random selection of
cases compiled from cases sent to LexisNexis from the actual courts. Although primarily
consisting of random cases, LexisNexis also contains cases with historical or legal
significance. AB discussed below, although the sample is random, it consists of a
disproportionate share of cases re-tried in a higher court. As such, conclusions drawn
from this study are most appropriately made for cases in such judicial settings.
In addition to the custody outcomes, additional information was obtained by reading the
detailed case summaries provided by LexisNexis. Data on the age and gender of the
judge, the level of court in which the case was tried (district, family, superior, appeals),
and a dummy variable accounting for differences in state laws regarding joint custody
(defined as a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if there is a state law supporting a
presumption in favor of joint custody (See "Facts about Children and the Law" for
details)). A.Bide from these legal variables, data were collected regarding the family
structure: the number of minor children, age of children (measured as a dummy variable
indicating the age of the youngest child), number of total children in the family, gender of
children (dummy variables for the cases of all boys and all girls), instances of special
2

Specifically, nine of the cases were removed because of split custody decisions. Additionally, three cases
involving the children going to a relative or party other than the mother and father were eliminated, and two
cases being deleted because of missing variables.

3

Split custody cases were omitted from the sample.

needs children, whether parents are married or not, length of marriage/relationship, and
income data on both spouses. 4
Given that I have omitted split custody decisions, there are three outcomes in a child
custody case: mother-sole custody, father-sole custody, and joint custody (for both legal
and physical custody). When the dependent variable can take on only a limited range of
distinct categories, unique econometric issues are raised preventing standard Ordinary
Least Squares estimation (see below for details). Summary statistics on this data appear
in Table 1 in the Appendix.
Interesting patterns emerge regarding the child custody outcomes. With regard to legal
custody, mother-sole custody is most prevalent with 56 percent ofall cases awarding sole
legal custody to the mother. In contrast, father-sole custody occurred in 17 percent of the
cases, and joint legal custody was awarded 27 percent ofthe time. Similarly, physical
custody outcomes also tend to favor the mother: in 70 percent ofall cases sole mother
custody is awarded, compared to 20 percent for father-sole physical custody and 10
percent for joint physical custody. In addition, I find in the sample that in 81 percent of
the cases in which the mother was awarded physical custody she was also awarded legal
custody, compared to 85% percent for sole father legal custody also being granted sole
physical custody and 100 percent for joint custody. 5 Thus, in this sample mother- sole
custody is the dominant outcome, but less so for legal custody in which case the joint
custody outcome occurs frequently.
In this sample, approximately 95% of the spouses had been married, with an average
marriage length of 10.2 years. Households in this sample have between one and four
minor children, with a mean family size of3.69 (approximately 1.69 children). More
specifically, 37 percent offamilies consist oftwo-children, 11% are three-child families,
and 3% of cases involved four children (and almost half- 49% - of families consist ofan
only child). In only .5% (or a total of12) of all cases was there a child identified as a
special needs child by the court.
The next three independent variables listed in the chart represent the age groups of the
youngest minor child in each of the families. The ages are broken up into age groups of
zero to two, three to five, and six to ten. The mean of the percent ofcases in which the
youngest child is between the ages of zero and two is 0.239. Therefore, the percentage of
families in which the youngest child is between these ages is approximately twenty-four
percent of 222 cases or fifty-three families. Thirty-four percent of the cases in this
sample have a youngest child between the ages ofthree and five. This is seventy-five
cases out of222 observations. Finally, twenty-eight percent of families in this sample
4

I follow Cancian and Meyer (1998) in the definition of many variables. Specifically, the number of
children has been broken up to show the number of two child families, three child families, and four child
families. These data are represented by dummy variables. Similarly, the ages of children being converted
into the variables of youngest child between the ages of zero and two, three to five, and six to ten.
5

Additionally, I find that in all cases where the spouse receiving physical custody does not also obtain legal
custody, legal custody is granted jointly.

have a youngest child between the ages of six and ten. This percentage equals sixty-two
cases out of222 observations.
The next set of independent variables deals with the court in which the case was tried.
These independent variables consist of the percent ofcases tried in Family, Appeals,
Superior, and Supreme Court. There are 222 observations for each ofthese variables.
Only 0.009 of the cases in this sample have been tried at the Family Court level. Five
percent ofthe 222 cases have been tried at the Superior Court level and fifty percent have
been tried at the Appeals level. This leaves 44 .1 percent ofthe cases that have been tried
at the Supreme Court level. This distribution demonstrates the partiality to Appeals and
Supreme Court cases in this sample. It also suggests a pattern in the income levels that
will be described next.
Income data suggest that this sample is heavily skewed towards wealthy families. The
mean household income for my sample is $185,469 with a maximum value of
$13,200,000. Clearly, relative to the population, the sample contains a disproportionate
share ofhigh-income families. This, however, is not surprising given that most ofthe
cases are being tried in a higher court (presumably on appeal), effectively eliminating
relatively poor households who could not afford the legal costs.
The variable total household income has 222 observations with a mean of 185,469. This
number is translated to mean that the sample has an average total income of $185,469.
This number is going to be significantly higher than that ofthe actual population because
most of the observations in this sample are cases from a higher court- appeals and above.
This is because the sample is made up ofmostly the families that can afford to appeal the
decisions made in the lower courts. As shown by the minimum and maximum values and
the standard deviation for this variable, the distribution ofincome, is very large. The
minimum total income in the sample is zero while the maximum income in the sample is
$13,200,000.
Overall, there is ample variation in many ofthe variables, allowing me to test the impact
ofjudicial, social, and economic factors on the outcomes ofchild custody cases. Given
these data, I now turn to a discussion ofthe most appropriate empirical methodology.
The econometric literature related to the analysis of limited dependent variables is large
and well grounded (see Maddala 1983). In this study, the dependent variable can take on
three distinct and complete outcomes: mother only custody, father only custody, and joint
custody. Under this condition, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator will produce biased
results. To correct for this, I employ a multinomial logit analysis and specify
heteroskedasticity robust errors. The method of employing this type of analysis involves
determining the number (N) of different choices available and creating N-1 dummy
variables to describe the choice. Each dummy variable will equal one only when that
alternative is chosen. In this analysis, one alternative is chosen to be the base alternative
with the other alternatives compared against this base with a logit equation.

Following Cancian & Meyer (1998), I specify the sole mother outcome as the base
category. As such, regression results will indicate the impact of each independent
variable on the likelihood of both sole father custody relative to sole mother custody and
the likelihood ofjoint custody relative to sole mother custody. This model will be
different, however, from Cancian & Meyer (1998) in that I explore both the physical and
legal outcomes of child custody decisions. Therefore two separate regressions are
produced, one regression determining legal custody and one run on physical custody.
The following represents a multinomial logit equation where m equals the base
alternative mother sole custody,fequals father sole custody, andj equals joint custody:

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 2 of the Appendix reports the legal custody multinomial logit results.6 The legal
characteristics of the case provide intriguing results. First, note that the presence of a
state law favoring the presumption oflegal custody is statistically significant at the . 05
level and positive for both the joint custody outcome as well as the father-sole custody
outcome. Thus, it appears that the presence of this law increases the probability of not
only joint custody over mother-sole custody, but also improves the likelihood offather
sole custody compared to mother-sole custody. This result is consistent with the belief
that joint custody laws are an effective way to secure legal rights for fathers.
In addition, there is little empirical evidence to support assertions that the background
characteristics of the judge impact the legal custody decision. In particular, a judge's age
and gender have, individually, no statistically significant impact on the legal custody
decision. Although the sign for judges' gender is consistent with the notion that male
judges are more likely to award either joint or father-sole custody relative to mother-sole
custody, the results are not statistically significant.7 Furthermore, the judge's age has
opposite signs for joint custody and father-sole custody (in addition to not being
statistically significant).
In this study I see a general pattern emerge with regard to the court dummy variables.
Relative to the Supreme Court, the lower courts tend to rule more in favor ofjoint
custody and father-sole custody relative to mother-sole custody.8 The Superior Court
dummy is positive and statistically significant for both joint custody and father-sole
custody, indicating that, relative to the Supreme court, the Superior court is more likely to
6

These results are robust to alternative model specifications (including interaction terms and non-linear
effects), which are available upon request
7
This variable equals one for male judges and O for female judges.
8
The exception is the appeals court, but this result is not statistically significant.

favor either joint or father-sole custody compared to mother-sole custody. Also, it can
bee seen that family court has a positive and, in the case of father-sole custody,
statistically significant impact on legal custody.
Interestingly, I find scant evidence supporting the notion that family social variables have
an impact on legal custody outcomes. The age of the children, the number of children
and the gender of the children do not statistically impact the legal outcome. 9
The presence of a special needs child does increase the likelihood of joint legal custody
relative to mother-sole custody, perhaps as an effort to reduce future legal uncertainty for
the child. However, it is apparent that many of the traditional social factors that are
assumed to play a role in the determination of legal custody do not play a role in this
sample.
Finally, I find limited evidence that income plays a statistically significant role in legal
custody outcomes. First, the likelihood of joint custody compared to mother-sole custody
appears to be independent of income (either the mother's share of total family income, or
the father's income). However, the likelihood of father-sole custody decreases relative to
mother-sole custody as both mother's share of income and father's income level
increases. 10 Although it is reasonable to suspect that as the mother's share of family
increases, her ability to care for the child individually increases and therefore the
likelihood that she receives sole legal custody increases, the result on father's income is
less clear. Speculating, as father's income rises, his ability and likelihood to provide
child support increases, thereby decreasing the potential harm associated with mother
sole custody, thus increasing the likelihood of this outcome.
In summary, I find little evidence that the social backgrounds of all participants in the
case (including the judges) statistically impact the outcome. Granted, there are important
variables potentially excluded that have begun to enter the literature (such as religious
beliefs and sexual orientation (Volokh 2006) that I have not controlled for. In contrast,
the legal and economic environments do impact the custody outcome and in ways
consistent with the theoretical literature. I now tum my attention to the analysis of
physical custody.
In Table 3 of the appendix I present the multinomial logit results for physical custody.
This analysis broadly conforms to the results regarding legal custody. Once again, the
characteristics of the judge do not provide any statistically significant impact on child
custody outcomes. Furthermore, it appears that lower courts tend to reduce the likelihood
of mother physical custody. Most notably, the sign and coefficient on family court for
joint custody is extremely high and significant at the .05 level. Thus, trying a case in
family court, all else equal, will greatly increase the likelihood of joint custody relative to
mother-sole custody.
9

The exception is all boys for father sole custody. This result, significant at the . 15 level, suggests that a
family of all boys is more likely to go to the father compared to the mother, all else equal. Although
consistent with prior beliefs, because the other social variables are not significant, and this variable is not
significant at the .05 level, we urge caution on reading too much into this one result.
10
These results are statistically significant at the .10 level.

Interestingly, the presence of a law favoring joint custody does not have a statistically
significant impact on joint custody ( although the sign is correct), but it does increase
chances of father-sole custody relative to mother-sole custody. As such, my work
provides evidence that the impact ofjoint custody laws on physical custody tend to
promote father-sole custody, consistent with the literature regarding the father rights
movement (Mason 1999).
Unlike the legal custody analysis, family social characteristics play a more significant
role in physical custody determination. In particular, there is evidence that a large family
size (four child family) increases the likelihood ofjoint custody relative to mother-sole
custody. In addition, the sexes of the children play an important role in physical custody.
As shown in Table 3, the presence of either all boys or all girls increases the likelihood of
joint custody relative to mother-sole custody. Not surprisingly, the presence of all girls
decreases the likelihood of father-sole custody relative to mother-sole custody. Also,
there is evidence that the presence of special needs increases the likelihood of father-sole
physical custody relative to mother-sole custody. Finally, if the parents were married I
see a significant increase in the likelihood of joint custody relative to mother-sole custody.
In terms of income, as the mother's share of the family income increases, the likelihood
that she will receive sole physical custody relative to both joint custody and father-sole
custody increases ( and these results are significant at the .1 level). Also, I find that as the
father's income increases the likelihood of father-sole physical custody decreases.
Perhaps this effect is driven by the judge's joint decision regarding both custody and
child support. As the father's income increases, there is (speculating) a greater chance of
relatively large and likely child support payments, which could reduce the cost of
granting sole mother custody.
Overall, I see similar patterns emerge for both legal and physical custody. In particular, I
find laws favoring joint custody negatively impact the likelihood of mother-sole custody,
and positively impact the likelihood of father-sole custody. As the case moves up
through the court system, the likelihood of mother-sole custody tends to decrease. Race
and gender of the judge has no impact on the outcome, nor do (many) of the social
characteristics of the family. Gender of the children plays a role in physical custody
outcomes but not legal custody. Special needs children positively impact joint legal
custody and father-sole physical custody. Finally, income dynamics play an important
impact, and the results generally conform to the literature.
VI. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
The implications and results of this study have strong ties to many economic foundations.
To begin, this study demonstrates how a qualitative social science question may be
answered using econometrically based quantitative analysis. The variables used to
analyze child custody decisions were quantified using numerical documentation such as
logits (mother-sole custody, father-sole custody, joint custody), dummy variables (three

child families, marriage), and continuous variables (length of marriage, income). The
result of this analysis allowed the answers to this qualitative question to be quantified.
Another important economic concept explored in this study is cost-benefit analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis is examined though the weighting of parental rights and the best
interests of the child. The judges trying each of the cases examined weighed the costs
and benefits of their custody decision based on the independent variables represented in
the study. The results show the outcomes of these decisions and which factors are
determined to be the most influential and beneficial to the children and parents involved
in the custody dispute.
Lastly, trade-offs are explored throughout this study when determining the best interest of
the child. Several variables require a judge to inspect the trade-offs involved in custody
decisions. This becomes important in decisions such as whether to split siblings up in a
custody decision and in what way to institute child support obligations.
VD. CONCLUSION
Using a random search of the LexisNexis database, I constructed a new, cross state
dataset of child custody cases. These data provide a unique set of information allowing
us to address empirically a range of questions that have largely been ignored to date.
Specifically, there is speculation in the literature that the judge's age and/or gender may
influence child custody decisions. My work does not support this claim.
There has been great speculation in the popular press regarding laws favoring joint
custody. In particular, some believe that joint custody laws are a wedge issue for father
rights groups enabling greater prevalence not only ofjoint custody but also of father-sole
custody. I do find that the presence ofjoint custody laws do indeed positively (and
significantly) impact not only joint legal custody, but also father-sole legal and physical
custody. In addition, it appears that generally lower courts are more likely to grant legal
and, to a lesser degree, physical custody to either both parents or only the father relative
to mother-sole custody.
Social characteristics of the family follow less clear patterns. Generally, they play a
greater role in physical custody outcomes compared to legal custody. The presence of a
special needs child raises the likelihood ofjoint legal custody and, surprisingly, father
sole physical custody relative to mother-sole custody. To a lesser extent, children's
gender tends to influence physical custody, and family size somewhat impacts both legal
and physical custody.
Finally, income characteristics of the mother and father impact both legal and physical
custody. Increases in the mother's share of family income improve the likelihood of
obtaining both legal and physical custody. Furthermore, increases in the father's level of
income increase the likelihood of father-sole legal custody, but decreases the likelihood
of father-sole physical custody.

Aside from the direct results described above, I generally conclude that greater research
i
is warranted. Frst, a more detailed examination of social factors will conform better with
the current topics regarding marriage and child custody. In particular, recent work has
begun to loosely shed light on the importance of religious beliefs and sexual orientation
on child custody. My type of analysis would provide a clearer picture regarding these
issues in child custody decisions. More fundamentally, I argue that both the theoretical
and the empirical literature on child custody decisions should focus on modeling the joint
decision judges often implicitly make regarding both child support and child custody
decisions. With the appropriate data, using a seemingly unrelated regression technique
would provide, in my view, a more appropriate statistical analysis of child custody
outcomes.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Father-Sole Legal Custody

222

0.232143

0.423462

0

Joint Legal Custody

222

0.341837

0.47554

0

Father-Sole Physical Custody

222

0.22439

0.418201

0

Joint Physical Custody

222

0.126374

0.333187

0

1

% Married or in Relationship

222

0.945945

0.226635

0

1

Length of Relationship

222

10.24775

6.09107

1

29

Variable

Maximum

% Families with all boys

222

0.386363

0.488026

0

% Families with all girls

222

0.30909

0.463172

0

2 child family(%)

222

0.364864

0.4824801

0

3 child family(%)

222

0.108108

0.311218

0

1

0.175144

0

1

14 child family(%)

222

0.031531

Number of Minor Children

222

1.675676

0.7920666

% Children with Special Needs

222

0.058558

0.235327

1

4
0

% Youngest child age 0-2

222

0.2387387

0.427276

0

% Youngest child age 3-5

222

0.337837

0.4740418

0

% Youngest child age 6-10

222

0.2792793

0.4496589

0

% Cases tried in Family Court

222

0.009009

0.0947008

0

% Cases tried in Superior Court

222

0.045045

0.207871

0

% Cases tried in Appeals Court

222

0.495495

0.5011096

0

Judges Gender % Male

222

0.837837

0.369432

0
82
13200000

Judges Age

222

62.11261

8.58662

39

Average Total Family Income

222

185469

917738.4

0

Father Income

222

98383.92

257775.4

0

Mother Income

222

87479.15

873513.6

0

13000000

Mother's Share of Familv income 1%)

222

29.11666

20.33191

0

100

2945454
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Table2: L eg.alCustodM
Joint Custodx
Father-Sole Custodx
Independent Variable
Standard Error Coefficient
Standard Error
Coefficient
.459
.491
.158
.671
Judge's Gender
.006
.002
-.024
.027
Judge's Age
.835*
.
3
98
.411
1.07*
Joint Law
- 0. 38
.380
-.121
.389
AppealsCourt
**
1.
7
89*
1.001
Superior Court
I.058
2.464
.471*
.968
34.244
.787
FamilvCourt
1.433
.856
YoungestChild0-2
1.1
-.350
1.069
.691
.969
YoungestChild3 -5
-.289
.544
.560
YoungestChild6-10
.867
.043
.217
.492
.137
2 Child Family
.553
.219
.809
3 Child Family
.769
.24
.462
4 Child Family
1.2
1.14
I.45
.061***
.585
All boys
.66
.931
-.287
.653
.184
All Girls
6. 09
1.229
.718
Special Needs
.339*
.703
.042
Marriage Length
.064
-.004
.052
Mother Share Income
.010
-.017
.012
-.008**
1
.77
Father's Income
e
4.8 e-07
06**
-8.79 e-07
l.69 e-06
I.767
-3 .66
Constant
.227
2.364
R:.i= .1485
* indicates significance at the.05 level.
* * indicates significance at the .10 level.
*** indicates significance at the.15 level.
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Table 3 Ph1ys1ca 1 CustodIV Mu1tmonu
·a1Lo.
.
>gtt Resu ts
Father-Sole Custody
Joint Custody
Standard Error Coefficient
Coefficient
Standard Error
Independent Variable
0.391
0.903
0.886
0.609
Judge's Gender
0.002
0.028
0.006
0.023
Judge's Age
1.002*
0.571
0.641
0.391
Joint Law
1.193
0.449
0.815
0.876
Superior Court
-0.281
2.858
55.285*
0.689
Family Court
0.886
0.853
0.854
Youngest Child 0-2
0.679
0.501
0.845
-0.351
Youngest Child 3-5
0.652
0.474
0.794
0.156
Youngest Child 6-10
0.694
2 Child Family
0.121
0.722
.001
0.527
3 Child Family
1.766
1.504
-0.387
0.811
4 Child Family
2.455
22.715*
0.047
1.159
-0.619
21.025*
2.577
All boys
0.617
-.901**
20.816*
2.294
All Girls
0.569
0.939
0.901
.986**
Special Needs
0.682
-0. 189
1.495
Marriage
19.229*
0.709
0.012
-.007**
Mother Share Income
-.019**
0.01
-1.05 e-06**
5.76 e-07
-6.94 e-07
Father's Income
7.28e-07
-1.739
Constant
-43.046
1.925
2
R = .1485
* coefficient 1s significant at the 95% confidence level
** coefficient is significant at the 85% confidence level

